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MAKING NUISANCE ECOLOGICAL
J.B. Ruhlt

INTRODUCTION

"The essential premise of much environmental law is... that
the physical characteristicsof the ecosystem generate spatial
and temporal spillovers that require restrictions on the
private use of natural resources far beyond those
contemplatedby centuries-oldcommon law tort rules. '
Common law nuisance doctrine has the reputation of having
provided much of the strength and content of environmental law prior
to the rise of federal statutory regimes in the 1970s. 2 Beginning in the
t Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property, The Florida State University College of
Law, Tallahassee, Florida. I am thankful for the comments I received on early versions of this
and related work from Jonathan Adler, Rob Fischman, Eric Freyfogle, Dennis Hirsch, Alex
Klass, John Nagle, Jim Salzman, from participants in Florida State's April 2006 Symposium on
The Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services, and from participants in workshops at Florida State
and Indiana-Bloomington. Ali Stevens, FSU Class of 2007, provided valuable research
assistance, and the Florida State University College of Law sustained my research through
financial and other support. Please direct all comments or questions to jruhl@law.fsu.edu.
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 121 (2004).
2 Most comprehensive treatments of the evolution of environmental law begin with the
common law as the first meaningful stage of development. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott et al.,
Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 313, 315 (1985). In particular, over time the nuisance doctrine developed into a
powerful means of regulating the environment, so much so that Professor Bill Rodgers, Jr.
observes in his environmental law treatise that
[t]here is no common law doctrine that approaches nuisance in comprehensiveness or
detail as a regulator of land use and of technological abuse. Nuisance actions reach
pollution of all physical media-air, water, land, groundwater-by a wide variety of
means. Nuisance actions have challenged virtually every major industrial and
municipal activity that today is the subject of comprehensive environmental
regulation...
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1 at 112-13 (2d ed. 1994). The extent to
which state legislation was effective in controlling regulation prior to the emergence in the
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1960s, however, two trends pushed nuisance doctrine into the
background of environmental law and public legislation into the
foreground.3 The first was the growing attention given to the
development of pollution standards that could be applied broadly
across regions and across industries. The premise of turning to public
legislation was that this objective would much more easily and
effectively be met through regulatory approaches relying on
standards,
permitting
promulgation
of
technology-based
requirements, and administrative enforcement than it would through
judicial mediation of common law nuisance actions.4 The Clean Air

1970s of federal legislation and its nationwide scope is a hotly debated topic, though there is
substantial empirical evidence that improvements in air quality, for example, were well
underway prior to the 1970s. See Indur M. Goklany, EmpiricalEvidence Regardingthe Role of
Nationalizationin Improving U.S. Air Quality, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 27-53 (Roger E.

Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000). The debate over whether states exhibit the so-called
"race to the bottom" without federal intervention is summarized in Jody Freeman & Daniel A.
Farber, Modular EnvironmentalRegulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 806-13 (2005).
3 For a thorough account of stages in the development of statutory environmental law,
about which I do not go into more detail herein, see LAZARUS, supra note 1. Lazarus places
little emphasis on the common law origins of environmental law, mentioning the relevant
common law doctrines in only a few passing references in his 254-page history of
environmental law, and even there mainly to suggest their limitations. See id. at 36, 114, 121,
134, and 179. By contrast, almost 20 years earlier he observed that
the substantive scope of both public and private nuisance law has quite willingly
embraced environmental and natural resource concerns. In public nuisance cases,
courts have had no difficulty finding that threats to the natural environment and to
public health from environmental pollution implicate "rights common to the public."
The Restatement (Second) of Torts quite clearly draws the connection between public
nuisance doctrine and environmental protection. Moreover, the relevance of
environmental protection to private nuisance law is axiomatic. Private nuisance law
by definition restricts activities that interfere with the use and enjoyment of land.
Land is such a fundamental natural resource that most environmental threats,
whether directed at natural resources or public health, can easily be read as
interfering with the land's use and enjoyment, and thereby potentially raising private
nuisance claims.
Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Propertyand Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 660-61 (1986) (footnotes
omitted).
4 This premise was spelled out clearly in the famous New York case of Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), in which New York's highest court declined
to enjoin a cement plant's air emissions found to constitute a nuisance, ruling instead that a
damages remedy, previously not available under New York law, was the more efficient
approach. While known mostly for that shift in nuisance remedial doctrine, the court's rationale
for backing off injunctive relief sent a loud message to legislatures that their help was needed.
As the court warned:
It seems apparent that the amelioration of air pollution will depend on technical
research in great depth; on a carefully balanced consideration of the economic
impact of close regulation; and of the actual effect on public health. It is likely to
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require massive public expenditure and to demand more than any local community
can accomplish and to depend on regional and interstate controls.
A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of private litigation ....
This is an area beyond the circumference of one private lawsuit. It is a direct
responsibility for government and should not thus be undertaken as an incident to
solving a dispute between property owners...
Id. at 871. The date of the opinion, not coincidentally, marks the advent of the wave of federal
legislation regulating air, water, and land pollution. Similarly, Lazarus asserts that nuisance and
other common law "'background principles' have never been adequate to deal with
environmental concerns, which is why environmental law evolved beyond those principles to
fill the gap with detailed standards and regulatory controls." LAZARUS, supranote 1, at 134. He
is joined by many. See, e.g., Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using
Nuisance Law to Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVTL. L. 403, 414-15 (1997); Glenn P.
Sugameli, Takings Bills Threaten PrivateProperty, People,and the Environment, 8 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 521, 560 (1997). After almost forty years operating under this central tenet of
modem environmental law, it is no surprise that law students are taught today, quoting from a
leading property law casebook, that "nuisance litigation is ill-suited to other than small-scale,
incidental, localized, scientifically uncomplicated pollution problems." JESSE DUKEMINIER ET
AL., PROPERTY 665 (6th ed. 2006). Similarly, a leading environmental law casebook asserts that
"there is wide agreement that private nuisance actions alone are grossly inadequate for resolving
the more typical pollution problems faced by modem industrialized societies." ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 72 (4th ed.
2004). With emphasis on the alone in that proposition, there would be few quarrels. Many
environmental law scholars and practitioners contend, however, that the common law has a
larger role to play than is conventionally portrayed by supporters of the dominant public

legislation model. See generally CREATIVE

COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT (Clifford Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini, Eds., Environmental Law Institute
2007); THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR
MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000)
[hereinafter COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT]. For the most part this conversation has

taken place with respect to the role of the common law in regulating pollution, see, e.g., Jason J.
Czamezki & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental Common Law, 34
B.C. J. ENVTL. AFFS. 1 (2007); Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to
Environmental Regulation?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 515 (2002); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law
and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. (545 (2007); and Tom
Kuhnle, The Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Addressing Hazardous Waste Contamination,
15 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 187 (1996), whereas my focus is on the role of the common law in
managing ecological integrity. A few other authors recently have suggested an increased role for
the common law in ecological contexts. See, e.g., Ray Kirsch, What's the Buzz? Common Law
for the Commons in Anderson v. State Department of Natural Resources, 29 HAMLINE L. REV.
338 (2006); Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Expanding Traditional
Notions of Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 283 (2006); Christine A. Klein, The New
Nuisance: An Antidote Justin Pidot, Note, The Applicability of Nuisance Law to Invasive Plants:
Can Common Law Liability Inspire Government Action?, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 183 (2005). One
recently published property law casebook covers the topic in a section on "protecting natural
services" situated between the materials on nuisance law and lateral and subjacent support, all
three of which are topics covered in the chapter on "some basic rights and responsibilities of the
landowner." PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP,
USE, AND CONSERVATION 167-76 (2006). Law casebook coverage is also found, appropriately,
in JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RuHL, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT 402-09 (2nd ed. 2006).
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Act and Clean Water Act are the classics of this public legislation
model of pollution control. 5 The second trend-the one of particular
importance for my purposes-was the growing attention being given
to protecting and managing species and ecosystems for their intrinsic
and ecological qualities. Once again, nuisance doctrine was widely
perceived to be a poor fit, 6 and statutory regimes such as the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA") blossomed.7
The effect of these two trends and their associated rise of federally
legislated environmental law was to put nuisance doctrine into a state
of hibernation for the last quarter of the twentieth century insofar as
ecological attributes of the environment were concerned. Although
nuisance has continued not infrequently to provide a viable cause of
action in pollution contexts, 8 one will search in vain for decisions
prior to 2000 applying nuisance law in contexts anything like those
addressed through statutory programs such as the Endangered Species
Act and other ecosystem management statutes. 9 Perhaps nuisance law
lacked the capacity to do so, or was made superfluous in this respect
by the statutory regime, or even was inherently biased against it,' 0 but
whatever the explanation, it is hard to describe nuisance doctrine in
that era as having had anything to do with being ecological."l
There is a new trend afoot, however, and it is one I believe could
awaken nuisance doctrine to make it more relevant to ecological
concerns. The discipline of ecological economics, which emerged in
the 1980s and gained full steam in the 1990s, has focused on putting
an economic price tag on degradation of ecological integrity.12
5 See LAZARUS, supranote 1, at 70-72.
6 As reflected in the quote from Lazarus that opens this article. See LAZARUS, supra note
I and accompanying text.
7 For thorough histories of the emergence of ecologically-oriented statutes and the
development of ecosystem management law in general, see RICHARD 0. BROOKS, Ross JONES,
& ROSS A. VIRGINIA, LAW AND ECOLOGY: THE RISE OF THE ECOSYSTEM REGIME (2002);

NAGLE & RUHL, supranote 4, at 361-409 (2nd ed. 2006).
8 See Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on
Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 903, 942-61
(2004) (discussing modem state common law cases dealing with waste contamination).
9 As one court observed at the close of the twentieth century, there was then "no authority
for the proposition that knocking down a[n endangered] bird's nest on one's property has ever
been considered a public nuisance." Boise Cascade Corp. v. State, 991 P.2d 563, 570 (Or. Ct.
App. 1999).
I0 I explore these three explanations in J.B. Ruh], Ecosystem Services and the Common
Law of "The FragileLandSystem ", 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, 3 (2005).

11 I develop this point in more detail in J.B. Ruhl, The Background Principlesof Natural
Capital and Ecosystem Services-Did Lucas Open Pandora'sBox?, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.

L. 525 (2007) [hereinafter BackgroundPrinciples].
12 The discipline of ecological economics was well underway by the 1990s, with the
journal by that name starting in 1989 and a full-length book on the topic breaking the path for
more to follow. See ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS:

THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT

OF

SUSTAINABILITY (Robert Costanza ed., 1991). And with their publication of Ecological
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Ecosystems have long been regarded as the source of valuable
commodities and recreational pursuits, uses which, obviously, do not13
always align with the goal of maintaining ecological integrity.
Statutory programs aimed at maintaining ecological integrity as a
priority thus have resorted to rattling off other values in support of
their underlying purposes, such as the ESA's declaration that
endangered species "are of esthetic, ecological, educational,
historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its
people."' 4 A major thrust of ecological economics, however, has been
to illuminate the role of ecosystems as providing economically
valuable services to "the Nation and its people." These ecosystem
services include flood mitigation and groundwater recharge from
wetlands, water filtration and sediment capture from forests, nutrient
cycling, gas regulation, pollination, thermal regulation, carbon
sequestration, and so on.1 5 Although monetizing the value of these
services is more complex than estimating the economic value of

Economics, Herman Daly and Joshua Farley have firmly planted the discipline on the university
curriculum landscape. See HERMAN E. DALY & JOSHUA FARLEY, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS:
PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS (2004).

13See NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 4, at 1003-35.
14 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(a)(3) (2000).
13 The concept of ecosystem services is not new, but it is sufficiently recent that it is yet to
be fully developed into coherent policy terms, and surely not yet into hard law to be applied.
Mooney and Ehrlich trace references to "services" in connection with ecosystems as far back as
1970. See Harold A. Mooney & Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecosystem Services: A Fragmentary History, in
NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 11, 14 (Gretchen C.

Daily ed., 1997). Walter Westman was the first to attempt to assign numbers to the values of
what he called "nature's services," relying on the postulated technology costs of replacing or
repairing impaired ecosystem functions. See Walter E. Westman, How Much Are Nature's
Services Worth?, 197 SCI. 960 (1977). Soon thereafter, in a little-noticed article, Edward
Farnsworth et al. outlined one of the earliest comprehensive frameworks for considering the
value of services provided by natural ecosystems. See Edward G Farnsworth et al., The Value of
Natural Ecosystems: An Economic and Ecological Framework, 8 ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSERVATION 275 (1981). Edward 0. Wilson later gave ecosystem services prominent
mention in his epic study of biodiversity, The Diversity of Life, published in 1992. See EDWARD
0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 305-10, 396 (1992). Then a research team led by Robert
Costanza grabbed national media headlines in 1997 with their estimate that global ecosystem
service values were over $30 trillion. See Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's
Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1997). Later that year the highlyinfluential book Nature's Services established the ecological basis for ecosystem service theory
in many different ecosystem settings. See NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON

NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997). Most recently, the United Nations'
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment published a global survey of the production and delivery of
ecosystem services. See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN

WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS (2005), available at http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/
synthesis.aspx. For a more detailed history, including coverage of the emergence of the
ecosystem services concept in legal literature, see James Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past
andFuture of Ecosystem Services, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133 (2006) [hereinafter Fieldof
Green].

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3

timber or hunting, 16 no reasonable argument can be advanced that
ecosystem services are not economically valuable.
Ecosystems services flow from the natural capital found in
ecosystems such as forests, wetlands, coastal dunes, estuaries, and
other ecologically defined units of study. 17 However we define
ecosystems and delineate their boundaries, though, one thing is
certain: in many contexts an ecosystem will overlay a patch-work of
private and public property ownership boundaries, and in such cases it
is likely that the natural capital from which ecosystem services flow
frequently will be located on parcels different from those where the
service benefits are enjoyed. From the viewpoint of owners of natural
capital, therefore, ecosystem services often are positive externalities
leaking off the parcel, the value of which is difficult to capture in the
market.18 From the viewpoint of the owners of land where the
services are enjoyed, however, curtailment of the services through
degradation of the natural capital could pose significant economic
injury. So, when an owner of land wants to transform a wetland or
forest into, say, a shopping center, and the owner of other land
receiving ecosystem services from that natural capital objects on the
basis of the economic injury that will result because of increased
flooding or decreased pollination, who wins?
Neither the common law nor statutory law has established coherent
baseline norms for resolving this property rights issue. Legislation is
all over the board, reflecting attention to political expediency more
than forging a consistent system of property rights. Thus some
statutory programs prohibit landowners (usually developers) from
degrading natural capital, 19 while other statutory programs pay
landowners (usually farmers) for not degrading natural capital. 20 The
common law's history of ecological inertness hasn't helped shed light
16 Of course, this has proven to be the most significant obstacle to recognizing ecosystem
services in environmental decision-making. See James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 887 (1997).
17 Land has always been treated in classical and neoclassical economics as one of the
essential factors of production. In ecological economics, the concept of natural capital provides
a major extension beyond "land" in terms of recognizing the importance of natural resources to
the production of economically valuable goods and services. See Paul Elkins, Carl Folke, &
Rudolf De Groot, Identifying Critical Natural Capital,44 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 159, 160
(2003).
18 For background on the economics of ecosystem services, see GEOFFREY HEAL,

NATURE AND THE MARKETPLACE: CAPTURING THE VALUE OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 21-60

(2000).
19 Chief among these are the Endangered Species Act and Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act, which regulates discharge of fill material into waters of the United States, including
wetlands. See NAGLE & RUHL, supranote 4, at 274-310, 659-97.
20The Conservation Reserve Program and other "green subsidies" are designed to do this
on agricultural lands. See NAGLE & RUHL, supranote 4, at 1003-16.
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on the relative property rights in natural capital and ecosystem
services either. Yet the door was opened for pressing nuisance
doctrine into service in this regard by, of all events, the Supreme
takings decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Court's 1992 regulatory
21
Coastal Council.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas set up the now infamous
categorical takings test for environmental regulation: if a statutory
provision removes all economic value from all of a parcel of land, it
will be treated as a per se taking of property unless the statute goes no
further than to duplicate restrictions that would already have been
imposed under the state's common law of private and public
nuisances and other "background principles" of property law.22 All
that is of interest about that test for my purposes is the "background
principles" exception to the categorical takings rule. Before the Court
was a South Carolina coastal protection program that met the rule for
treatment as a categorical taking, thus raising the issue of whether the
"background principles" exception applied. Although leaving that
question to the state courts, Justice Scalia speculated that because
other landowners in the area had been developing their beach lots
prior to the state adopting the statute, it was "unlikely that commonlaw principles would have prevented [development] on petitioner's
land."23 Yet he also acknowledged that past practices do not paralyze
the common law, but rather that "changed circumstances or new
knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer
so.''24 His recognition of the evolutionary force of the common law
21
22

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Id.at 1029. It is not within the scope of my purpose to add to the voluminous body of

literature evaluating the rule of regulatory takings law established in Lucas. I take it as it is.
Moreover, although it is less than clear what fits in the "background principles" for purposes of
Justice Scalia's test, it is perfectly clear that state nuisance law does. See Robert L. Glicksman,
Evolving Voices in Land Use Law: A Festschrift in honor of Daniel R. Mandelker, 3 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 149, 164-82 (2000) (reviewing post-Lucas case law on the scope of "background
principles").
23 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
24 Id. This is a long and widely held conception of the common law. For example, in
support of the proposition Justice Scalia pointed to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
explains with respect to nuisance claims that
[t]he character of a particular locality is, of course, subject to change over a period of
time and therefore the suitability of a particular use of land to the locality will also
vary with the passage of time. A use of land ideally suited to the character of a
particular locality at a particular time may be wholly unsuited to that locality twenty
years later. Hence the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded must be
determined as of the time of the invasion rather than the time when the use or
enjoyment began.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 cmt. g (1979). In short, "the specific harms that
nuisance governs are neither fixed nor objective. Rather, what nuisance law treats as a harm is
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has spawned a cottage industry in environmental law circles
examining how nuisance and other common law property doctrines
might develop toward more ecologically-minded values so as to
deflect regulatory takings claims lodged against applications of
ecologically-minded statutes.25
To be candid, my interest in this regard is not motivated by any
particular sense of how large or small the Lucas categorical takings
universe should be. Rather, I am interested primarily in advancing the
broad integration of natural capital and ecosystem service values into
environmental decision making, only one implication of which may
be to shrink the scope of categorical takings. I recognize that many
people believe stronger environmental protection through legal
evolution should be based on scientific, moral, and ethical arguments
on behalf of ecological integrity-i.e., not based on welfare
economics. 26 Yet I propose taking a more instrumentalist, and I think
more realistic, approach based on the economic value of natural
capital and ecosystem services. Integrating natural capital and
ecosystem service values into environmental decision-making,
however, does not preclude or even displace considering scientific,
moral, and ethical factors as well. Moreover, scientific, moral, and
ethical arguments have only moved the nuisance ball so far with
respect to natural capital and ecosystem services, and clearly not far
enough, so it seems counter-productive to refuse to consider
instrumentalist arguments that focus attention of the courts and all
people on the raw economic value to humans of natural capital and
the provision of ecosystem services. It is not as if ecosystem services
would not exist but for the efforts of economists and ecologists

highly contextual and determined by community norms." Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of
Harm in EnvironmentalLaw, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 897, 904 (2006) (citations omitted).
25See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principlesas CategoricalTakings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005);
John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1 (1993).

26For example, Jim Chen has objected that
[t]he
instrumentalist view inherent in the ecosystem services concept dictates that
the "chemical, physical, and biological" integrity of basic environmental media such
as water not be viewed as an objective for its own sake, but rather as the critical first
step toward achieving human goals such as "propagation of fish" and "recreation in
and on the water."
Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89 IOWA
L. REv. 495, 548 (2004). The environmental philosopher Mark Sagoff has more vehemently
dismissed focusing on ecosystem services as excessively instrumentalist and likely to obscure
the non-instrumental values of the environment. See MARK SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2004).
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examining their economic potential. They have measurable value to
humans, and whether we know their precise economic value or not,
the fact that society has to choose how to allocate natural resources
necessarily requires valuation of ecosystem services in some form or
another. Failure to refine our understanding of their economic values,
and the consequent inability to account for those values in regulatory
and market settings and, more importantly, in the public mind, is
unlikely to promote the conservation of natural systems. As David
Pearce has put it, "the playing field is not level; rather, it is tilted
sharply in favor of economic development. Two things have to be
done to correct this situation. First, one has to show that ecosystems
have economic value-indeed, that all ecological services are
economic services. Second, a way has to be found to 'capture' the
nonmarket values of ecosystems and turn them into real benefits for
those who practice conservation. ' '27 Robert Costanza et al. made the
point more succinctly in urging that "although ecosystem valuation is
certainly difficult and fraught with28uncertainties, one choice we do
not have is whether or not to do it."
Pursuing that theme, in other work I have suggested that efforts in
ecological economics to develop the principles of ecosystem services
identification and valuation provide the kind of "new knowledge" that
common law property doctrines use to "make what was previously
permissible no longer so, ' ' 29 and I have examined the handful of
recent cases that do exactly that in connection with applications of
public nuisance and public trust principles. 30 In this installment of my
exploration of the topic, I delve deeper into the fit between ecosystem
services and the doctrines of private and public nuisances.3 1 Part I of
the Article outlines the prima facie case of an "ecosystem services
nuisance," showing that the conventional doctrine of private and
public nuisance is aptly suited to engaging situations when one
landowner manages his or her property so as to deprive another of
economically valuable ecosystem services. Temporal, spatial, and
cumulative effects may complicate such cases, but do not shift this
form of injury outside the scope of nuisance. Part II examines the
advantages and disadvantages of relying on nuisance law in this
27 David Pearce, Auditing the Earth: The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and
Natural Capital,40 ENV'T 23, 23 (1998).
28 Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital,387 NATURE 253, 255 (1997).
29 See Ruhl, FragileLand System, supranote 10, at 8.
30 See Ruhl, BackgroundPrinciples,supra note 11.

31 In our work on a companion article, James Salzman and I do the same for the public
trust doctrine. See J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust
Doctrine- Working Changefrom Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 223 (2006).
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context. The primary advantages are the local focus of nuisance law
and its information-producing effects, whereas the disadvantages
normally associated with common law claims are not strongly
operative. Part III argues that the ecosystem services nuisance theory
of liability should be pursued alongside statutory regimes designed to
manage natural capital and ecosystem services, so as to promote
legitimacy of the statutory program and to help insulate it from
regulatory takings claims. On the other hand, Part III also argues
against a more expansive common law theory designed to encompass
moral, ethical, and scientific harms to our sense of ecological
integrity.
I. ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND THE PRIMA FACIE CASE-AN EASY FIT
In Palazzolo v State,32 a Rhode Island trial court considered a
regulatory takings claim the United States Supreme Court had left
dangling in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.33 The Supreme Court had
rejected the claim that state agency denial of a permit to fill and
develop a marsh area adjacent to a pond constituted a categorical
taking or property under Lucas, on the ground that the agency
allowed Palazzolo to develop some of his parcel, leaving it to the state
courts initially to decide whether the permit denial was a regulatory
taking. The state trial court reasoned that Lucas "establish[ed] public
nuisance as a preclusive defense to takings claims, '34 and found that
"clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Palazzolo's
development would constitute a public nuisance ' '35 on the following
grounds:
Palazzolo's proposed development has been shown to have
significant and predictable negative effects on Winnapaug
Pond and the adjacent salt-water marsh. The State has
presented evidence as to various effects that the development
will have including increasing nitrogen levels in the pond,
both by reason of the nitrogen produced by the attendant
residential septic systems, and by the reduced marsh area
which actuallyfilters and cleans runoff This Court finds that
the effects of increased nitrogen levels constitute a

32 Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct., July 5, 2005)
[hereinafter Palazzolo].
33 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
34 Palazzolo, 2005 WL 1645974 at 5.
35

Id.
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predictable (anticipatory) nuisance which would almost
certainly result in an ecological disaster to the pond.36
Palazzolo thus involved the type of transboundary property rights
issue that is likely to be ubiquitous for the law and policy of natural
capital and ecosystem services, and the case demonstrates the easy
time public nuisance law should have for integrating those values into
a straightforward analysis: Palazzolo owned the marsh; the marsh
filtered and cleaned runoff into the pond; those services were positive
externalities flowing off of Palazzolo's property; the public in general
enjoyed the economic benefits of that service; Palazzolo therefore had
no property right to fill the marsh. It's that simple.
Nevertheless, as easily as the court's decision integrated ecosystem
services into public nuisance doctrine, the decision also illustrates the
difficulty of making the same move in private nuisance doctrine or in
affirmative claims of public nuisance. The nuisance analysis arises in
cases like Palazzolo only in connection with the government's
assertion of the nuisance exception to the landowner's regulatory
taking claim. If the government can establish the exception under the
public nuisance branch simply by demonstrating the qualitative effect
on ecosystem service delivery, it need not establish proof of
quantitative economic harm to specific property owners. The
government's litigation incentives thus are far different from those a
private landowner or sovereign might advance through an affirmative
nuisance claim against conduct like Palazzolo's filling of the marsh.
In Palazzolo, for example, although the court acknowledged the
"valuable filtering system" the marsh provided 37 and that the pond
and marsh system provided "amenity value to ...the land owners in
the area,", 38 the curtailment of ecosystem service values to private
landowners did not register in the record or with the court. The court
simply noted that "no neighboring landowner has made a private
nuisance claim" and that the potential for obstruction of views of the
water would not constitute a private nuisance under Rhode Island
law. 39 It would have been unlikely, however, that any neighboring
landowner would advance a private nuisance claim having to do with
loss of the marsh filtering function before it was known whether the
state would grant the permit for the project in the first place, and such
litigation was unnecessary after the state rejected the permit. In short,
the law of ecosystem services in nuisance doctrine is unlikely to
36

Id. (emphasis added).

31 Id. at 3.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 6.
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develop significantly in the context of government defense of
regulatory takings claims-it will emerge only when private
landowners and sovereigns start suing over the adverse effects of
natural capital degradation.
Consider four possible scenarios in which one landowner's
degradation of natural capital might cause economic injury to another
landowner, group of landowners, or larger segment of the public by
curtailing the flow of ecosystem services:
* The Simple Scenario: Landowner A modifies Parcel A in
such a way as to degrade natural capital (e.g., coastal dunes)
on Parcel A supplying ecosystem services (e.g., storm surge
mitigation) to Landowner B on Parcel B. Parcels A and B are
adjacent; the effects of Landowner A's conduct are felt on
Parcel B very soon after Parcel A is modified (e.g., during the
next major storm); and the effects on Parcel B are clearly and
exclusively attributable to Landowner A's conduct.
* The Spatially Complex Scenario: The same as the Simple
Scenario, but in this case Parcels A and B are located at a
considerable distance apart (e.g., ten or more miles).
• The Temporally Complex Scenario: The same as the
Simple Scenario, but in this case the effects on Parcel B are
not felt until a considerable time after Landowner A's
conduct (e.g., three or more years).
* The Cumulative Impacts Scenario: A few or many
landowners (Group A) modify their respective parcels in such
a way as to degrade natural capital (e.g., wetlands) supplying
services (e.g., downstream flood mitigation) to a few or many
other landowners (Group B) on their respective parcels. Some
parcels in Groups A and B are in close proximity, but others
are not; the effects of Group A's conduct are felt on some of
Group B's parcels soon after the Group A parcels are
modified, but only after a significant time for others; and
while the effects on Group B's parcels are clearly and
exclusively attributable to Group A's conduct, particularly as
the number of landowners in Group A increases it is not clear
which Group B parcels are affected by modifications on
particular Group A parcels.
Presumably, if private and public interests believe they are harmed
substantially in these "ecosystem service nuisance" circumstances,
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they will invest in, among other things, litigation designed to find
some fit between a common law remedy and their alleged injury,
even if that means proposing that a court make what amounts to an
evolutionary move in the applicable common law doctrine. 40 The
outcome under regulatory takings cases such as Palazzolo suggests
that, with reliable evidence of significant injury resulting from
curtailment of ecosystem services, private nuisance actions, as well as
public nuisance actions prosecuted in the affirmative rather than as a
defense to regulatory takings claims, ought to be a viable forum for
this kind of "evolution-inducing" litigation. Focusing on the relevant
qualitative differences between the four scenarios, this section
provides the template for designing private and public nuisance
claims in settings such as these.
A. PrivateNuisance
In its barest essence, a private nuisance is "a nontrespassory
invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
land."'4 As every first-year law student quickly learns, this maxim is
not particularly useful on its own, but rather opens the door to a
complex "reasonableness" inquiry.42 Justice Scalia described the test
in Lucas as an "analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to
public lands and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the
[landowner's] proposed activities, the social value of the
[landowner's] activities and their suitability to the locality in
question, and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be
avoided through measures taken by the [landowner] and the
government (or adjacent landowners) alike. 4 3 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts provides a version of this balancing inquiry in the
principle that "[a]n intentional invasion of another's interest in the use
and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if ...the gravity of the harm
40 See Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 51 (1977)
(explaining the reasons why private interests attempt to influence the evolution of common
law). People who believe their economic interests have been injured in through circumstances
such as these might also seek legislative or administrative relief or pursue litigation under
statutory causes of action.
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979).
42 The Restatement divides private nuisances into two categories, intentional and
unintentional. Intentional acts that invade another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
land can be nuisances only if they are unreasonable in so doing, whereas unintentional acts must
be negligent, reckless, or abnormally dangerous to be exposed to liability. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). Although natural capital might be destroyed through
negligent, reckless, or abnormally dangerous behavior, in the text I cover the more common
situation in which intent is present as defined, see supranotes 32-40, and thus unreasonableness
of the acts must be shown.
43 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-1031 (citations omitted).
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outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct. '4 4 Although not all
jurisdictions follow it in all respects, and some do not follow it in
many respects, in this section I have adopted the Restatement's
framework for analyzing the four ecosystem service nuisance
scenarios.45
1. IntentionalInvasion

One objection to the proposed ecosystem services nuisance theory
of liability is that the defendant has not "invaded" the plaintiffs
property by introducing adverse conditions, but rather has simply
interfered with benefits flowing from the defendant's property to the
plaintiffs property. Indeed, with odors, noise, and dust as the classic
fodder of private nuisance doctrine, the black letter element of an
"invasion" can easily be thought of as requiring defendant to have
caused some physically measurable "bad" phenomenon to "move"
from the defendant's parcel to the plaintiffs, such that there is
quantifiably "more" of it on the latter (as in, plaintiff's property is
smellier, noisier, or dustier).
Even under this narrow conception of invasion, however, many if
not most ecosystem service nuisances would satisfy the element. The
consequence of interfering with the storm surge mitigation benefits of
coastal wetlands, for example, is more flooding inland. And the
consequence of interfering with the sediment capture benefits of
riparian habitat is more sediment in the river. Whether the defendant
stands on the banks of the river and dumps sediment in from a
wheelbarrow or causes the same amount of sediment to enter the river
by destroying riparian habitat, the effect is the same in all four of the

44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979). The Restatement also recognizes that
"the gravity of the harm, as objectively weighed ....
may be found so severe that in and of
itself it requires compensation, regardless of the weight of the utility of the conduct."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 cmt. b (1979); see also id. §829A (1979).
Recognizing that harm from an ecosystem service nuisance might be so severe as to qualify for
such treatment, in the text I cover the harder case in which balancing is necessary.
45 As stated supra note 44, I do so in order to test my thesis against the defendant-centered
balancing approach of the Restatement, which allows defendants to resist liability by
demonstrating offsetting economic or social utility. As of 1990, only 15 states had explicitly
adopted the Restatement's balancing test, though many had formed some form of hybrid
between it and prior tests focusing principally or primarily on the level of interference the
plaintiff suffered. Indeed, as a compromise the Restatement adopted a provision dispensing with
the balancing test in cases of "severe" harm to the plaintiff if only compensation is sought. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829A (1979). For a thorough history of the law prior to
and after the Restatement and how the Restatement arrived at the compromise between the
balancing test of section 826 and the escape provision of section 829A, see Jeff L. Lewin,
Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189
(1990).
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scenarios-something "bad" moves from defendant's property to
plaintiff's.
In some cases, however, it would be accurate to observe that the
defendant is only depriving a benefit to other properties, such as when
destruction of forest habitat reduces local pollination services
available to an agricultural use of property. 46 In such cases, the
argument would go, the withdrawal of benefits, even though the
direct cause of plaintiffs injury, does not amount to an invasion
within the meaning of nuisance doctrine. But the invasion element
means nothing of the sort. As the Restatement explains, "private
nuisance has reference to the interest invaded and not to the type of
conduct that subjects the actor to liability. 4 7 In other words, what
matters is that the plaintiff is made worse off. And the plaintiff clearly
is demonstrably worse off in the withdrawal of benefits class of cases
using the kind of evidence applied in all nuisance cases-a physically
and economically measurable phenomenon on plaintiff's property.
Indeed, the Restatement treats "physical damage to tangible property"
as the bull's eye of private nuisance, precisely because, unlike
physical discomfort or annoyance to the plaintiff, "it can be more
readily be observed and measured., 48 Thus nowhere in the
Restatement is the "invasion" element linked to particular classes of
conduct that would exclude withdrawal of ecosystem service benefits
from the scope of actionable injuries. Taking the plaintiff's point of
view as the appropriate perspective, therefore, even the withdrawal of
ecosystem service benefits should meet the invasion element of
private nuisance.

46

The pollination example might raise objections based on the loosely analogous

principle that a landowner is not liable for failure to abate "natural conditions" of land, a classic
example of which is the acts of birds, animals, or insects. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 840(1) and 840(1) cmt. a (1979). However, the Restatement explains that "the term
does not comprehend conditions that would not have arisen but for the effect of human
activity," id., which would be the case in the withdrawal of pollination benefits from actions
such as removal of habitat. Although not directly on point with the development of an
ecosystem services nuisance claim for interference with pollination, the Minnesota Supreme
Court recently held that a negligence cause of action could be brought to seek damages for the
economic injuries beekeepers suffered when their bees, while visiting nearby cultivated poplar
trees the state and a company were growing for biomass, ingested pesticides and spread the ill
effects throughout the hives. The court upheld the lower court's dismissal of a private nuisance
claim because the beekeepers did not own the land on which the hives were maintained. See
Anderson v. State Department of Natural Resources , 693 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005); see
generallyKirsch, supranote 4 (discussing Anderson in detail); Alexandra B. Klass, Bees, Trees,
Preemption, and Nuisance: A New Path to Resolving Pesticide Land Use Disputes, 32
ECOLOGY L.Q. 763, 799-805 (2005) (discussing Anderson and other beekeeper cases involving
pesticide).
47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. b (1979).
48 Id. § 827 cmt. d.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3

Having established that ecosystem service nuisances of all
varieties can satisfy the invasion element, the plaintiff must also show
that defendant intended the invasion. The Restatement describes an
act as intentional for these purposes if the actor "acts for the purpose
of causing it"49 or "knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain
to result from his conduct." 50 On the assumption that most
landowners do not degrade natural capital with the express purpose of
injuring other landowners, the question in most ecosystem service
nuisance cases will be the defendant's state of knowledge. On this
element, unlike the invasion element, the outcome is likely to vary
between the four scenarios.
The Simple Scenario sets up the classic case in which it will be
more difficult for the defendant to plead lack of intent. Even with no
intent to harm, the defendant likely is in a position plainly to observe
the effects on plaintiffs property of degrading the natural capital, and
thus acts with intent within the meaning of the Restatement.51 And
even if the causal effect is not immediately apparent, once it is
brought to defendant's attention, either by notification or by
would
observation, continued degradation of the natural capital
52
constitute intent within the meaning of the Restatement.
As the effects of natural capital degradation become more spatially
or temporally removed from defendant's conduct, what the defendant
knew would result or be substantially certain to result is likely to be
subject to more debate. Here is where the burgeoning ecological and
economic knowledge about natural capital and ecosystem services
will play an important role in the development of ecosystem service
nuisance cases. After events like Hurricane Katrina, for example, it
should be reasonable to expect anyone in coastal regions of the Gulf
to understand the effects of degraded coastal marshes and dunes on
the protection of inland areas from storm surges, and that those
effects can be felt at considerable distances from the location of the
conduct and not until well after the conduct takes place.53 Similarly,
41 Id.§ 825(a).

50 Id.
§ 825(b).
51Id.§
825 ill. 2.
52 Id.§ 825 ills. 3-4.
53 The historical losses of coastal and freshwater marshes in the Mississippi Delta region,
and the consequences thereof for protection from storm surges, are covered comprehensively in
a series of articles in a recent publication from the National Wetlands Newsletter. See
NATIONAL WETLANDS NEWSLETrER, AFTER THE STORM: RESTORING AMERICA'S GULF COAST

WETLANDS (2006) [hereinafter AFTER THE STORM]. Coastal "wetland grasses, sedges, and trees
reduce the effective water depth and can cause storm waves to touch bottom, or 'break,' further
offshore, dissipating their energy many miles from sensitive built structures. Wetland soils also
absorb wave energy, reduce the depth of flooding, bind soil, and reduce erosion .... Inland
wetlands reduce flooding by storing and conveying floodwaters... Experts estimate that a 1-
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the injuries to forests, crops, and public health that once led the
United States Supreme Court, with little hesitation, to find that
emissions from copper smelting plants in Tennessee posed a public
nuisance in Georgia did not happen adjacent to the plants or
immediately upon their commencement of operations. 54 Hence, it is
not as if nuisance law evaporates with time or distance, but rather the
plaintiff's burden of proof regarding defendant's state of knowledge
simply becomes more demanding. Doubtless, there will be cases
fitting the Spatially Complex Scenario and Temporally Complex
Scenario in which the plaintiff cannot meet that burden, but likely
there will be many in which the plaintiff can. And as knowledge
about natural capital and ecosystem services builds and spreads,
plaintiffs will more frequently and easily meet the burden.
The same should be true for the Cumulative Impacts Scenario as
well, where the question of defendant's knowledge is complicated not
by time or distance, but by the dispersed quality of cause and effect.
A defendant in this kind of ecosystem service nuisance case might
argue that one could not reasonably be expected to have known that
an injury such as increased sediment in a lake or river would be
exacerbated by such a small loss of riparian habitat as the defendant
claims to have caused. But pleading ignorance of cumulative impacts
effects in the environment is becoming increasingly difficult except
for the severely ignorant. Here, in particular, nuisance doctrine can
lean heavily on the amassed knowledge of cumulative environmental
impacts derived from statutory programs such as the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 55 and Endangered Species Act
(ESA).56 NEPA's requirement that federal agencies consider the
cumulative environmental effects of their proposed actions57 has

acre wetland can hold up to 1.5 million gallons of water." Jon Kusler, Wetlands, Hurricanes,
and FloodHazards,in AFTER THE STORM, supra, at 34.34-35.
54 See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). For background on the
Tennessee Copper case, see PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 82-84.
55 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).
56 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
57 Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires federal agencies to "include in every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the
responsible official on... the environmental impact of the proposed action." 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(2000). These statements, known as environmental impact statements, must include examination
of the proposed action's "cumulative impacts," defined as the impacts on the
environment
resulting "from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable future actions.... Cumulative impacts can result from individually
minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time." 40 C.F.R. §
1508.7 (2007).
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produced an extensive body of case law on the topic 58 as well as a
refined methodology for doing so. 59 And the ESA has focused
attention on the cumulative effects of habitat loss, which is the
leading cause of species decline domestically. 60 Similarly, knowledge
is increasing of the cumulative impacts of piecemeal degradations of
natural capital, 61 and public awareness is following in step. The voters
of Louisiana, for example, recently overwhelmingly approved
amendments to the state constitution earmarking state revenue
sources to coastal wetlands restoration and conservation.62 One who
levels a coastal dune or fills a riparian wetland, therefore, and who
witnesses others doing the same up and down the beach or river, will
be increasingly hard-pressed to claim lack of knowledge that he or
she contributed to the overall effect of reduced protection from storm
surges and floods at other locations. The question ought not to be one
of intent in those circumstances, but rather one of the substantiality
of
63
each person's participation in the action causing the harm.
58

See THE NEPA LITIGATION GUIDE 72-79 (Karin P. Sheldon and Mark Squillace

eds. 1999).
59 See, e.g., Council on Environmental Quality, Considering Cumulative Effects Under the
National Environmental
Policy Act, available at http://www.nepa.gov/nepa/ccenepa/
ccenepa.htm.
60 See David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United
States, 48 BIOSCIENCE 607 (1998) (compiling the documented causes of imperilment for over
1800 domestic species and finding that habitat loss is the single greatest threat in all species
groups, followed by spread of invasive species).
61 Once again the Gulf Coat's wetland marshes provide the example, where 1,900 square
miles of coastal wetlands were lost between 1932 and 2000, and 1.1 million acres-and area
larger than Rhode Island-since 1900. Jim Bays, EcologicalEngineeringand the Restorationof
Louisiana's Marshes, in AFTER THE STORM, supranote 53, at 3.
62 One measure provides that eligible federal revenues received by the state generated
from Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas activity shall be credited to the Coastal Protection and
Restoration Fund and used only for purposes of coastal wetlands conservation, coastal
restoration, hurricane protection, and infrastructure directly impacted by coastal wetland losses,
and the other measure requires twenty percent of the proceeds of tobacco securitization to be
deposited in the Coastal Protection and Restoration Fund, with a portion to be used for barrier
island stabilization and preservation.
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834 cmt. d (1979) (With respect to liability for
nuisance, "when a person is only one of several persons participating in carrying on an activity,
his participation must be substantial before he can be held liable for the harm resulting from
it."). This principle has come up in many cases involving an indivisible personal injury caused
by multiple sources of harm such as pollution and dangerous products, each source contributing
a small share of the total harm, with states mixed over the burden the plaintiff bears to attach
causation liability to individual sources. See Paul Homer, Indivisible Injury Negligence and
Nuisance Cases-ProvingCausation Among Multiple-Source Polluters:A State-by-State Survey
of the Law for New England, and a Proposalfor a New Causation Framework, 3 PIERCE L.
REv. 75 (2004) (surveying the case law of several states). The issue has come up most recently
in public nuisance cases brought against paint manufacturers alleging public health injuries from
lead paint. See Bruce R. Kelly and Ingo W. Sprie, Jr., Public Nuisance Cases as the Next Mass
Tort: The Lead PaintExperience, 21 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 695 (2006). It is likely that courts in
any particular state would treat the multiple-source aspect of the Cumulative Impacts Scenario
of ecosystem services nuisances the same as they have in these other types of multiple defendant
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2. Interest in Use and Enjoyment ofLand
The fact that the plaintiff is worse off and can show defendant so
intended points the analysis next to the matter of plaintiff's property
interest-i.e., whether it is of the type which, if injured as
experienced, gives rise to an actionable claim in nuisance. As far as
nuisance doctrine is concerned, however, this is simply a standing
requirement, in that "there is liability only to those who have property
rights and privileges in respect to the use and enjoyment of the land
affected." 64 The Restatement, in other words, "does not state the rules
applicable in determining when a person's rights and privileges in
respect to land constitute property rights and privileges.
Those
65
questions are dealt with in the Restatement of Property."
Hence this element presents no opportunity for arguing that a
plaintiff does not have the right to a particular ecosystem service
benefit, such as pollination or storm surge mitigation. Nuisance law is
not about whether there is a "right" to ecosystem services any more
than it is about whether there is a "right" to specific levels of noise,
odors, or dust. The loss of ecosystem services, like noise, odors, and
dust, is simply the agent of injury to the plaintiff's property interest in
use and enjoyment. All that matters is that the plaintiff has a property
interest that extends to the specific use and enjoyment of the property,
such as farming or conducting a business, that plaintiff contends is
being impaired by the defendant's conduct, which for our purposes is
interfering with the delivery of a particular ecosystem service
benefit. 66 If plaintiff has such an interest, this element is met, and the

nuisance cases.
64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821E (1979).
61 Id. § 821E cmt. b.
6 As an example, the Restatement explains that "one who has a profit in the minerals in a
parcel of land has 'property rights and privileges' in the land, but can complain of an
interference with the land or its use only if the minerals or his use and enjoyment of them are
affected." Id. § 821E cmt. a. The ecosystem services property rights issue discussed in the text
finds a loose analogy in the so-called light-air-view cases, in which the question is the extent to
which nuisance doctrine can be used to prevent blockage of light, air, or view. See, e.g., Lee
County v. Kiesel, 705 So.2d 1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining Florida's recognition of
the right of "riparian view," preventing blockage of a riparian landowner's view to the river
channel). In some circumstances light or air can be seen as analogous to ecosystem services, if
not the medium for their delivery. For example, recognizing the value of light to solar power
generation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that interfering with the flow of light to solar
panels could give rise to a nuisance claim given that "[a]ccess to sunlight as an energy source is
of significance both to the landowner who invests in solar collectors and to a society which has
an interest in developing alternative uses of energy." Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 189
(Wis. 1982). But this approach has proven controversial, leading one commentator to observe,
consistent with my position with respect to ecosystem services, that
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analysis moves on to the gravity of harm/utility of conduct balancing
calculus.
3. Gravity of the Harm to Plaintiff
Section 827 of the Restatement identifies five important factors to
consider in the "gravity of harm" analysis: (1)extent of harm; (2)
character of harm; (3) social value of the use or enjoyment invaded;
(4) suitability of the use or enjoyment to the locality; and (5) the
burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.67 These and all
other relevant factors are to be weighed objectively, with the gravity
of harm being the overall product with "no general rule as to the
relative68 weight of the particular factors in all the ever-varying
cases."
There is nothing about these factors or the weighing of them that
puts ecosystem service nuisances in some qualitatively distinct
category compared to other nuisances. The injuries associated with
loss of ecosystem services can be severe, they are often manifested in
physical damage to tangible property, and they can pose risks to
residences and socially valuable commercial and agricultural
operations that are perfectly suited to their localities.
With respect to the question whether the plaintiff can avoid the
harm, it is true enough that many ecosystem services can be replaced
through technological means, or that the risk associated with their
absence can be ameliorated through preventative measures. But
earplugs, clothespins, and dust masks can be worn to guard against
noise, odors, and dust too. The question isn't whether the plaintiff can
avoid the harm at all costs, but whether it is reasonable to expect the

[c]ourts have failed to probe a fundamental concept of nuisance law that underlies
the light-air-view cases. How should we define the property interest that the law of
nuisance protects? Is it necessary to say that the plaintiff has a specifically defined
property interest in light, air, and view, as discrete kinds of "property," or should we
define the protected property interest more broadly as use and enjoyment of the land?
If we must define the protected interests narrowly and discretely, then it is probably
true that the plaintiff has no protectable interest. But if the interest is defined broadly
as "use and enjoyment," then in many cases a plaintiff can show that blockage has
caused a severe loss of use and enjoyment and can, indeed, measure the loss by proof
of substantial loss of market value. The plaintiff would not automatically lose, but at
that point the analysis would shift to considering the reasonableness of the
defendant's activity and balancing the two parties' interests. Thus the light-air-view
cases deserve a more searching analysis than they have had.
WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY §7.2, at 416 (3d ed.

2000).
67

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (1979).

61Id. § 827 cmt. b.
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plaintiff to do so. 69 Nuisance law has not usually expected plaintiffs
claiming damage from excessive noise to install sound barriers, or
those claiming injury from slaughterhouse odors to filter their air. It
would seem strange, therefore, to expect the owner of inland property
to construct a seawall when beachfront owners level dunes to make
room for condos, or to expect a riverfront property owner to install
sediment filtration devices when forestland owners in the watershed
clear cut trees to make room for strip malls. In short, like the invasion
element, because the gravity of harm element focuses on the
plaintiffs perspective, ecosystem service nuisances appear rather
plain vanilla as far as nuisance doctrine is concerned.
4. Utility of Defendant's Conduct
Of course, as this is a balancing calculus, at some point the
defendant's perspective must enter into the picture. Section 828 of the
Restatement identifies three factors in the "utility of conduct" side of
the analysis: (1) the social value of the primary purpose of the
conduct; (2) the suitability of the conduct to the locality; and (3) the
impracticability of preventing or avoiding the harm.70 Several
considerations are likely to complicate the analysis of these factors
for ecosystem service nuisances.
First, it is likely that in some cases the conduct alleged to have
caused an ecosystem service nuisance will have long been thought of
in the community as socially valuable and suitable to the locality.
After all, many acres of coastal dunes, wetlands, and forests have
given way to development of one kind or another. But if this
condition were to foreclose an ecosystem service nuisance claim as a
matter of law, the new knowledge principle would be entirely
subverted. The point of the new knowledge principle is that we learn
the errors of our ways and adjust nuisance law accordingly. Now that
we know how economically devastating the loss of natural capital can
be locally and regionally, the fact that it was once seen as acceptable
ought to play a significantly diminished role on defendants' behalf.
As one court observed:
The rules and understandings as to the uses of land that are
acceptable or unacceptable have changed over time. The fact
69 In its relentless mission to render nuisance doctrine a test of reasonableness, the
Restatement explains that this factor "merely embodies the common sense idea that persons
living in a society must make a reasonable effort to adjust their uses of land to those of their
fellowmen before complaining that they are being unreasonably interfered with in what they are
doing." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 cmt. i (1979).
70 Id. § 828.
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that sewage was once strewn into city streets does not give
rise to a permanent reasonable expectation that such behavior
can continue indefinitely. .

.

.Despite the fact that one may

have purchased property with the expectation to use it in such
a manner that was acceptable before the purchase, there may
come a point in time when the
original owner's expectations
71
may no longer be reasonable.
In some cases, however, defendants might be able to point to
approval by federal, state, and local environmental and land use
authorities of the alleged degradation of natural capital to bolster the
claim of reasonableness of conduct. Nuisance law, for example, has
long struggled with the effect of the defendant's use complying with
local zoning ordinances, with the general rule being that compliance
weighs in favor of defendant on the issue of suitability.72 But most
environmental and land use statutes neither preempt nuisance law nor
directly address how they should be factored into the nuisance
analysis; indeed, federal environmental statutes routinely disclaim
any preemptive intent. 73 Hence, while approval of development in
dunes, wetlands, forests, or other ecosystems supplying local or
regional ecosystem services should weigh into the analysis in favor of
defendants, it ought not be taken as controlling in the balancing test.
The final complication is one inherent in all nuisance contexts, but
particularly so in the ecosystem service nuisance cases-i.e., that
almost all activities have some positive and negative externalities felt
somewhere else by someone else. The Restatement recognizes the
"obvious truth that each individual in a community must put up with a
certain amount of annoyance, inconvenience, or interference and must
74
take a certain amount of risk in order that all may get on together.,
So it cannot be that all losses of ecosystem services have a remedy in
nuisance. Indeed, what I have outlined as an ecosystem service
nuisance is intended to fit within the conventional doctrine of private
nuisance, not to morph it into a general ecological protection regime.
In the absence of a plaintiff whose use and enjoyment of property is
11Machipongo

Land and Coal Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 772-73 (Pa.

2002).

72 In general, "[c]ourts widely hold that a zoning ordinance permitting a use does not
immunize the use from being held to be a private nuisance. However, the weight given by a
court to the existence of an ordinance affects the question of whether the given use constitutes a
private nuisance." JULIAN CONRAD JEURGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW § 14.7, at 646 (1998).

73See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2000) (Clean Water Act provision expressly preserving
state common law remedies); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2000) (Clean Air Act provision expressly
preserving state common law remedies).
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. g (1979).
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substantially injured as a result of another landowner's degradation of
natural capital, no ecosystem service nuisance has been committed.
Likewise, the defendant's conduct must fit the doctrine as well. In
short, nuisance law must decide which degradations of natural capital,
taking into account the value of the defendant's primary purpose and
the possibility that government authorities have approved that
purpose, are within the scope of nuisance liability.
Ecological economists have developed the concept of critical
natural capital (also CNC) to identify ecological resources that
provide important ecosystem services and which are least amenable to
substitution. Ekins explains, for example, that "for any particular
CNC, and resulting environmental function, there is no substitute type
of capital, natural or human-made, which would enable the same
function to be performed to the same extent, i.e., the CNC is nonsubstitutable in respect of the function in question." 75 Surely when we
learn that a particular ecological resource fits this definition, the
prospect of private nuisance liability, perhaps even in strict liability,76
is an appropriate consequence for its destruction regardless of past
customs or government approvals. Between this critical threshold and
trivial losses of natural capital associated with socially necessary land
development suited to its surroundings, nuisance law cannot avoid its
balancing function. Somewhere on that range, in some ecosystem
service nuisance cases, the balance ought to tip in plaintiffs favor.
There is nothing about the fact that natural capital degradation is the
cause, or that loss of ecosystem services is the effect, to immunize
such injuries from this outcome in the doctrine of private nuisance.
B. Public Nuisance
A public nuisance "is an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public.

77

For the most part, the Restatement

treats the reasonableness component of that maxim the same as for
private nuisance. 78 As for rights common to the general public,
neither must they be rights in land,79 nor will rights in land held by
75 Paul Ekins, Identifying Critical Natural Capital: Conclusions About Critical Natural
Capital,44 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 277, 277 (2003); see also Paul Ekins et al, A Frameworkfor the
PracticalApplication of the Concepts of Critical Natural Capital and Strong Sustainability,
44 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 165, 174 (2003); Paul Ekins et al., Identifying CriticalNatural Capital,

44 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 159, 161 (2003).
7' The Restatement recognizes that private nuisance can be established in strict liability
for abnormally dangerous conditions and activities, pursuant to the rules applicable to such
conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. j (1979).
77 Id. § 821B.
78 Seeld. §§ 821B cmt. b, 826 cmt. a, and 827 cmt. a.
79

Id. § 821B cmt. h.
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numerous landowners necessarily amass into a right common to the
general public. 80 Ecosystem service nuisances seem ready-made for
public nuisance under all these conditions. The Palazzolo court, for
example, had little trouble finding liability for anticipatory nuisance
in the public nuisance version of the Simple Scenario, noting no more
than that "the 446 acre Winnapaug pond is a shallow, tidal pond used
for fishing, boating and shell fishing. . . . The adjacent salt marsh
provides, inter alia, a valuable filtering system regarding water runoff
containing pollutants and nitrogen from adjacent land., 81 The
Cumulative Impacts Scenario would likely also provide appropriate
cases for public nuisance treatment, as widespread depletion of
natural capital, particularly critical natural capital, could impose
significant public-wide economic and health impacts. The land-based
impacts of the ecosystem service losses, moreover, could provide the
"special injury" a private landowner would need to advance a public
nuisance claim.82 While the Cumulative Impacts Scenario is likely to
present more difficult questions of causation and the substantiality of
each individual defendant's contribution to harm, those are
appropriate questions for public nuisance cases, not barriers to
bringing the claim. 83 In short, as with private nuisance, nothing in the
80

Id. § 821B cmt. g.

81 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at 3 (R.I. Super. Ct.

July 5, 2005)
82 Under traditional doctrine, for a private party to prosecute a public nuisance action, the
person must have "suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the
public exercising the right common to the general public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 821C (1979). For a thorough examination of this doctrine, see Denise E. Antolini,
Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 755 (2001).
83There has been a recent renewed interest in public nuisance claims as a means of
redressing injuries alleged to be associated with pollution, the new twist being a focus on global
climate change as the agent of injury. For example, the Attorney General of California brought
public nuisance litigation claims against automobile manufacturers on the ground that the
greenhouse gases emitted by the cars they produce are contributing to a public nuisance in the
form climate change. See People v. General Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 272687
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (dismissing claims as political questions outside the scope of judicial
power). And several states sued a collection of electric power companies to enjoin the
defendants' emissions of carbon dioxide and other "greenhouse gases" alleged to cause global
warming. See Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (dismissing claims as political questions outside the scope of judicial power). To the
extent such cases include injury to the flow of ecosystem services as a basis of liability, they are
extreme examples of the Cumulative Impacts Scenario presenting, among other difficulties, the
problem of attributing causation to any of the individual defendants. See supra note 57. For
background on the climate change public nuisance theory, see Randall S. Abate, Automobile
Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a
"Global Warming Solution" in California,40 CONN. L. REV. 591 (2008); Klein, supra note 4,
at 1220-33; Dan Mensher, Comment, Common Law on Ice: Using Federal Judge-Made
Nuisance Law to Address the Interstate Effects of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 ENVTL. L. 463
(2007).
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Restatement or nuisance case law suggests that ecosystem service
nuisance claims fall in some special category for which the law erects
any sort of special barrier to public nuisance liability.

II.

PROS AND CONS OF THE IMPENETRABLE JUNGLE

As noted previously, nuisance doctrine's fall from grace in
environmental law started with the shift toward public law solutions
to the problems of pollution and ecological degradation. However,
although the rationales for deemphasizing nuisance in connection
with pollution control have been widely and aggressively stated for
decades, the same is not true for the ecological management side of
the policy space. For one thing, nuisance never was active in
ecological management issues, thus had no exalted place from which
to fall. Having never gotten in the game, the operating assumption
seems to have been that it never would-that if nuisance wasn't wellequipped to handle the demands of modem pollution control, it
wouldn't be for the demands of modem ecological management
either.
The ecosystem service nuisance framework I have outlined above,
however, is fundamentally different in character from the kind of
action the Boomer court thought it best to leave to the legislatures and
which so many environmental law scholars have suggested nuisance
law can't handle. I am not suggesting that nuisance law take on the
whole of ecosystem management law or anything like the technologybased, standard setting function of public pollution control law.
Rather, what I have in mind looks and feels like a rather conventional
nuisance action, the only novel feature being that the plaintiff is
linking damage to ecological resources on defendant's property with
injury to use and enjoyment of plaintiff's property. Hence, the
standard litany of nuisance's deficiencies in the pollution context
seems inaptly leveled against the ecosystem services nuisance. A
fresh look is warranted.
A. Information and the Place-BasedNature ofNuisance
Among the many criticisms of nuisance law in the modem
pollution control context, two in particular-that it is small scale and
local in nature-84-stand out as distinct advantages in the context of
natural capital and ecosystem services. Indeed, nuisance law often can
out-perform regulatory law in both respects.
8 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 665 ("nuisance litigation is ill-suited to other
than small-scale, incidental, localized, scientifically uncomplicated pollution problems").
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The place-based nature of nuisance law may have prevented it
from being the engine of national pollution control policy, but
ecosystem services nuisances often will present primarily local
contexts.85 Unlike pollution control, there is no relevant national
ambient goal or technology-based standard for ecosystem services.
The Simple Scenario pits landowners in close proximity against one
another and requires a close look at how one's actions affected the
other's property interests. Granted, the Spatially Complex Scenario
might stretch the geography of an ecosystem services nuisance
beyond a local context, in which case the plaintiff may also have a
stiff burden of proof. But even the Temporally Complex Scenario and
Cumulative Impacts Scenario could transpire completely within a
close local landscape.
In such cases, local state and federal judges will have much closer
proximity to the context than would a potentially distant regulatory
agency applying regulatory text. Common law judges work "in light
of the very real facts of very real cases," whereas "statutory
authorizations of the administrative state are premised perforce on
imagined facts., 86 And "the common law issues orders only to those
before the lawmaker. In contrast, statutes are meant to apply to the
whole world., 87 Courts thus rely on "sworn, scientific and focused
testimony rather than the generalities and anecdotes present in
Congressional hearings." 88 Indeed, some national environmental
statutory programs have been abject failures in terms of sensitivity to
local implementation effects on natural capital and ecosystem
services.89 The common law has its shortcomings, but one is not that
it is insensitive to local effects.
Moreover, because it is focused on a particular context, an
ecosystem services nuisance case is likely to generate information
about natural capital and ecosystem service values that would not
normally be produced from regulatory programs, yet which could be
generalizable to many other similar settings and added to the
storehouse of information. Assuming the plaintiff in a private
85 As Hylton observes, "[n]uisance law can be criticized for being too local, in the sense
that it does not aspire to create general regulatory rules, such as emission standards. On the
other hand, almost all reliable information is probably local." See Hylton, supranote 4, at 525.
86 David Schoenbrod, Protecting the Environment in the Spirit of the Common Law, in
COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supranote 2, at 3, 18.
87 Id.
88 Klass, Common Law and Federalism,supra note 4, at 582.

19See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Effects of Wetland Mitigation Banking on People,
28 NAT'L WETLANDs NEWSL., Mar-Apr 2006, at 1 (showing through an empirical study that
wetlands mitigation administered under the Clean Water Act and state law facilitated the
migration of wetlands from urban to rural areas with no consideration of the effects on
distribution of ecosystem services).
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nuisance case has suffered economic injury sufficient to motivate the
filing of a nuisance claim, investment in experts and the civil
litigation discovery process will unquestionably yield specific and
general information about natural capital and ecosystem services
values, actions that degrade their delivery, and alternatives that could
be adopted in land use to avoid such injuries. 90 The sovereign
prosecuting a public nuisance case also has incentives, both economic
and political, to pursue available information with focus. Indeed,
ecosystem services nuisance litigation could generate the sort of
information about natural capital and ecosystem service values that
one would not expect normally to be revealed through the routine
work of regulatory agencies, 91 and even less so through the routine
work of development, agricultural, and other land use interests. Once
revealed through private and public nuisance litigation, however,
evidence of the injuries suffered as a result of natural capital
degradation may place pressure on government and industry to
92
produce and provide such information more generally and routinely.
B. The Limits of Litigation in a Complex World
As enthusiastic as I am about the ecosystem services nuisance
theory of liability, I recognize that the common law has limits and
will meet them frequently with respect to the formulation of a
comprehensive policy of natural capital and ecosystem services. The
list of complaints about the use of common law in pollution control
contexts, for example, includes that it usually operates
retrospectively; remedies are less flexible; rules vary across
jurisdictions; judges are generalists; the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof, and it lacks international scope. 93 But most of these are not
90 See Hylton, supra note 4, at 525 (emphasizing the private incentives to generate
information in common law litigation).
91 The wetlands mitigation program administered under the Clean Water Act, for example,
includes no requirement that land developers or government agencies approving their land
developments generate any information about the pre- and post-development distribution of
ecosystem services associated with the wetland resources that are destroyed or those offered as
mitigation. See Ruhl & Salzman, supranote 89.
92 It is widely believed, for example, that tort litigation initially generated the growing
body of information about the risks allegedly associated with breast implants and motivated the
Food and Drug Administration and the industry to conduct focused scientific research. See
Marcia Angell, Shattuck Lecture-EvaluatingHealth Risks of Breast Implants: The Interplay of
Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1513, 1515 (1996);

David A Kessler, The Basis of the FDA's Decision on Breast Implants, 326 NEW. ENG. J. MED.
1713, 1715 (1992); Robert Rabin, Keynote Paper: Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88
GEO. L.J. 2049, 2068-67 (2000).
93 This is a summary of reasons found in ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY, 283-84 (2004). In general many of these

features lead commentators to charge the common law approach with presenting high
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strongly operative in the ecosystem services nuisance setting. Most
states allow claims to be brought regarding an "anticipatory
nuisance." 94 Nuisance law traditionally has had both injunctive and
damages remedies at its disposal.9 5 It is appropriate that local rules
develop for local ecosystem services nuisances, for which national
standards are neither necessary nor practicable. Judges have been
overseeing nuisance claims for centuries, and ecosystem services
nuisances involve distinctly economic considerations with which
judges are familiar. And most ecosystem services nuisances are
unlikely to have even the remotest connection to international
matters 96
.

The burden of proof issue and its related transaction cost effects
are, to be sure, sticking points for any kind of nuisance claim. My
construction of scenarios beyond the Simple Scenario recognizes this
constraint explicitly. As a general matter, however, the informationgenerating effects of nuisance litigation are in part attributable to this
very quality of tort law-i.e., that a plaintiff or group of plaintiffs
bringing suit aware of the burden of proof and the cost of litigation is
likely to fight vigorously and, in the course of doing so, dig deeper
into facts than an agency administering a regulatory program would.
Moreover, at this stage of the development of the law and policy of
natural capital and ecosystem services, one would be hard pressed to
claim that regulatory law, even with its lower burden of proof for
initiation of regulation and enforcement, has gotten anywhere based
on its purported advantages. Regulatory programs that one might

transactions costs, see, e.g., DANIEL COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING
OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 100-04 (2002), though this
hardly sets it apart from regulatory programs.
94The Restatement explains that "[a]n injunction may be obtained in a proper case against
a threatened private nuisance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. d (1979). See,
e.g., Palazzolo, 2005 WL 1645974, 5 (R.I. Sup. Ct. July 5, 2005) (recognizing anticipatory
nuisance as justification for rejecting a regulatory takings claim); see generally George P.
Smith, II, Re-validating the Doctrine ofAnticipatoryNuisance, 29 VT. L. REV. 687 (2005).
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 929-30, 941 cmt. c (1979).

96I agree that when an ecosystem services nuisance claim does involve political questions
touching foreign policy, courts are likely not to treat the claim as a simple nuisance case. For
example, several states recently sued a collection of electric power companies to enjoin the
defendants' emissions of carbon dioxide and other "greenhouse gases" alleged to cause global
warming. See Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005). The states argued that "the natural processes that remove carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere are now unable to keep pace with the level of carbon dioxide emissions," and that
the power companies therefore are "liable for contributing to a public nuisance, global
warming." Id. at 268, 270. Reminiscent of the Boomer opinion, however, the court dismissed
the lawsuit on the ground that "resolution of the issues presented here requires identification and
balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security interests" which are
"consigned to the political branches, not the Judiciary." Id. at 274.
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expect to be showcases of attention to natural capital and ecosystem
97
services have been found gravely wanting.
III. ASSESSING ALTERNATIVES
In the previous sections I have made the case that an ecosystem
services nuisance theory of liability is consistent with conventional
nuisance doctrine and offers to advance the law of natural capital and
ecosystem services in ways that seem particularly suited to common
law solutions. But are there better alternatives? Could regulatory law
do a better job without the common law at its side, or could the
common law do a better job without nuisance doctrine as its engine? I
believe the answer is no in both cases.
A. Relying Exclusively on Regulatory Law
Having co-authored a law school casebook titled The Law and
Policy of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, I am the last
person to suggest that regulatory law take a backseat to nuisance law
with respect to natural capital and ecosystem services. But two
important considerations lead me also to reject any notion that
regulatory law is adequate alone, that it will obtain no benefit from
the development of the ecosystem services nuisance cause of action
outlined above.
The first is the positive effect common law litigation can have on
the legitimacy of regulatory responses. The information function the
common law plays at the local scale adds up over time and space as
courts in one jurisdiction and across many jurisdictions shape
conceptions of liability and remedy. The Palazzolo court, for
example, moved swiftly from its finding that Palazzolo's
development would reduce a "marsh area which actually filters and
cleans runoff' 98 to its ruling that "clear and convincing evidence
demonstrates that Palazzolo's development would constitute a public
nuisance." 99 This judicial endorsement of the ecosystem services
nuisance theory of liability, if replicated in other Rhode Island courts
and in other jurisdictions, can help build a normative foundation upon
which public legislation can stand. Even critics of the utility of
nuisance law in modern pollution control contexts concede that
nuisance law did this for the regulatory law of pollution control.1°
97 See Debra Donahue, Federal Rangeland Policy: Perverting Law and Jeopardizing
Ecosystem Services, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 299 (2007).
" Palazzolo, 2005 WL 1645974, 5 (R.I. Sup. Ct. July 5, 2005).
99Id. at 5.
too
See, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 85 (although "the common law has proved
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There is no reason to believe it could not do the same for purposes of
the law of natural capital and ecosystem services.
The second and perhaps more important benefit nuisance law can
deliver to regulatory law in this field is one so obvious and powerful
it ought to silence any contrarians: if nuisance law does not
accommodate and grow the ecosystem service nuisance, regulatory
law will forever lock horns with regulatory takings law over the effect
of public regulation of natural capital on private property rights. As
the Palazzolo case illustrates, nuisance law provides an effective safe
harbor for regulation from the regulatory takings snarl, and can do so
with impacts far beyond the scope of the parties involved in any
single case. Palazzolo settled a dispute between one landowner and
the state, but its doctrinal precedent effect is potentially sweepingno doubt many other salt marshes in Rhode Island "actually filter[]
and clean[] runoff," making it more difficult after the decision to
argue that regulation protecting that ecosystem service value can be a
taking of property. Without that kind of new knowledge based
evolutionary move in the common law to clear the path, evolution of
regulatory law will face the relentless drag of regulatory takings
law. 101
I have little doubt that when ecosystem service nuisance doctrine
lays down a foundation of legitimacy and clears out the regulatory
takings fog, public law will dominate in the management of natural
capital and ecosystem service values. But I also have little doubt that
public law will have a much easier time developing, and will develop
much further, with the aid of the common law. Hence, I subscribe to
Professor Joe Sax's view, which he expressed at the dawn of the
legislative movement in environmental law, that
[u]se of the courts to evolve a common-law approach to
environmental problems adds to the arsenal of the public
to be a crude mechanism at best for controlling the onslaught of modem-day pollution .. .
[c]ommon law principles . . . have had an important impact on many current regulatory
programs"); PLATER ET AL., supra note 93, at 283 ("common law environmental litigation...
continues to play a very important role in the structure of modem environmental protection
law"). See also Albert Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 Wis. L.
REv. 897, 903 (2006) ("the origins of environmental law can be traced to tort law, particularly
to law of nuisance").
,01
This theme is what motivated Blumm and Ritchie in their survey of background
principles of property law that can be used, as is or as evolved, to deflect regulatory takings
claims. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 25. See also Eric Biber, A House with a View, 109
YALE L.J. 849 (2000) (suggesting that Florida's recognition of a right of riparian view, allowing
a riparian landowner to prevent another from blocking the view to the river channel, could be
used to prevent regulatory takings claims challenging regulations preserving scenic views of
river ecosystems).
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interest a significant weapon: the ability to meet problems as
they are identified and to formulate a solution appropriate to
the occasion-flexible, innovative, and responsive. To open
the way for common-law litigation is not to displace the
legislative function in setting standards or defining in precise
fashion environmental rights and wrongs. Problems
recognized and information elicited through litigation will
promote and complement continued and essential legislative
action. 102
For the most part, the environmental law of pollution control
ignored Sax's vision. I am suggesting that we avoid making the same
omission in the environmental law of natural capital and ecosystem
services.
B. Forginga Specialized Common Law Cause ofAction

One might argue that in defending the common law's role in the
conservation of natural capital and ecosystem service values, I
haven't gone far enough. Why stop at an ecosystem services nuisance

action-why not develop the theory of an ecosystem services action
in general, one not tied to nuisance but rather tied directly to natural
capital and ecosystem services? Or, why not expand the reach of
nuisance law to encompass protection of ecological qualities
regardless of the impact of landowner actions on the flow of
ecosystem services?
The most forceful articulation of this view, summarizing and
synthesizing the similar theories of other environmental law scholars,
appears in a recent law student comment on the "broadening" of
nuisance law in the "age of ecology., 10 3 The author points to a variety
of maxims environmental law scholars have posited that could be
used to justify this evolution of nuisance doctrine. Professor Jerry
Anderson, for example, has suggested that property owners hold their
land "subject to an implied condition that [it] be used in the public
interest. 'H' 4 And Professor Robert J. Goldstein has proposed that
courts recognize "green wood" in the proverbial bundle of sticks that

102 JOSEPH

L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION

248 (1970).
103See David S. Wilgus, The Nature of Nuisance: Judicial Environmental Ethics and
Landowner Stewardship in the Age of Ecology, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 99 (2001).
i4 Jerry L. Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward a "'BroaderVision " of Property

Rights, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 529, 551 (1989).
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defines property rights. 10 5 Using such abstractions, he outlines a
"broadened nuisance theory" under which
[c]ourts can promote the stewardship paradigm through
rigorous application of broadened nuisance principles and
through a rebirth of traditional notions of the dual role of
property. Specifically, when determining harm within the
nuisance context, courts must be guided by principles of
ecology with a sensitivity and emphasis upon the externalities
foisted upon the biological and social community in which
the landowner's activity has its effects. These externalities
would be the basis for how courts could judge the
reasonableness of an activity or the harm resulting from the
ecological nuisance. Aware of society's current emphasis on
the environment, courts should explicitly remind landowners
of the dual nature of property-that landowners hold their
property subject to the greater public good-thereby
implicitly directing landowner efforts and expectations
toward property away from destructive, negative externality06
causing behavior, and in the direction of stewardship.1
This formulation of nuisance, while attending to "externalitycausing behavior," goes well beyond my ecosystem services nuisance
theory of liability in its extension to "externalities foisted upon the
biological.., community." As I have yet to see a clear articulation of
how, precisely, the common law would operationalize such a cause of
action, ° 7 my short answer for now is that the very conceptions of
natural capital and ecosystem services are fundamentally
instrumentalist, which is why they fit so well into conventional
nuisance doctrine. The question whether to craft a special cause of
action, therefore, seems to me to be more a question about whether to
remain instrumentalist or not. If the answer is yes, then it strikes me
that nuisance law is best suited to serving as the home for the cause of
action. If the answer is no, that we should unshackle the cause of
105Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: FittingEnvironmental Ethics
and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 347, 386-87 (1998).

supra note 103, at 125-26.
environmental law professor Bruce Pardy has proposed a detailed "Ecological
Sustainability Act" model statute prohibiting actions that cause "permanent ecosystem change."
106Wilgus,

107Canadian

See Bruce Pardy, In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law: A Rule to Solve the
Problem, 1 McGILL INT'L J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. AND POL'Y 29 (2005). Although

incorporating ecosystem services as partial justification for his model statute, see id. at 51, and
providing a private cause of action for damages, see id. at 55, Pardy, like Wilgue, goes well
beyond by covering actions that alter an ecosystem's "diversity, stability, or resilience" without
regard to impact on the flow of ecosystem services. See id at 54.
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action from the instrumentalist qualities of natural capital and
ecosystem services, then the question really is about whether to
provide common law remedies for injuries to moral, ethical, and
08
scientific values, in this case related to our ecological surroundings.'
While nuisance law is no stranger to "moral" nuisances that involve
little or no environmental or sensory impacts, 10 9 this would be a
monumental change in direction for a body of law that heretofore has
been decidedly non-ecological, if not downright anti-ecological.
Rather, I propose changing nuisance law's focus by tempting its
instrumentalist core with the economics of natural capital and
ecosystem services.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps the gravest mistake we could make with respect to natural
capital and ecosystem services is to think that anything about them is
static. They are the products of dynamic ecosystem functions. They
are affected by constantly shifting land uses. Our knowledge of them
widens and deepens. The law of natural capital and ecosystem
services, one thus must expect, will change. I recognize that statutory
change on this front is necessary and long overdue. And statutes are
likely where nonutilitarian values-the ethics of ecology-will be
better represented. But the common law doctrine of nuisance is
particularly well-suited to change based on the instrumentalist
qualities of natural capital and ecosystem services, easily integrating
them into its profoundly instrumentalist core. In this sense, I have
proposed using natural capital and ecosystem services not as an
assault on nuisance doctrine, but as a tribute-they are my Trojan
horse for bringing about change in the common law based on new
knowledge.
108The question of what constitutes actionable or regulable "harm" is persistent and
pervasive in environmental law. Albert Lin's recent survey of the topic provides a thoughtful
typology and analysis of the kinds of harms that have presented the most challenges in this
respect: fear and emotional injury, subcellular damage and risk of harm, uncertainty and
emerging technologies, and harm to the environment. See Lin, supra note 24, at 945-83. The
harm to the environment category raises the issue I discuss in the text. Lin argues that the
difficulty in addressing this category stems from the tension between liberalism's
instrumentalist focus on harms to humans-centered values and environmentalism's
deontological focus on harms to the intrinsic values of nature. See id. at 977-83. He concludes,
and I agree, that "until society grapples with the question of what interests matter and how to
account for differing values, struggles will continue over environmental law at the boundaries of
the harm principle." Id. at 983. Lin only very briefly mentions harm to ecosystem services,
using it as an example of an liberalism's focus on harms to the environmental that affect
instrumental values, see id. at 979 n.464, perhaps because he also does not see it as a difficult
issue.
,09See John Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265 (2001).

